Younghan Bae (ETH Zürich)
Counting surfaces on Calabi-Yau 4-folds abstract
Abstract:
After the work of Klemm and Pandharipande in 2007, counting curves on Calabi-Yau fourfold has been an important subject of the enumerative geometry. Unlike counting curves, not much is known for counting surfaces. In this talk we will consider various sheaf theoretic invariants which count surfaces on Calabi-Yau 4-folds. I will give examples which suggest new phenomena in the 4-fold theory. Some consequences will follow from conjectural correspondences between those theories. This is work in progress with Martijn Kool and Hyeonjun Park.
14:00 • ETH Zentrum, Rämistrasse 101, Zürich, Building HG, Room G 19.1
Cecilia Parlatore (New York University)
Abstract:
We develop a tractable framework to study the optimal design of stress scenarios. A risk-averse principal (e.g., a manager, a regulator) seeks to learn about the exposures of a group of agents (e.g., traders, banks) to a set of risk factors. The principal asks the agents to report their outcomes (e.g., credit losses) under a variety of scenarios that she designs. She can then take remedial actions (e.g., mandate reductions in risk exposures). The principal’s program has two parts. For a given set of scenarios, we show how to apply a Kalman filter to solve the learning problem. The optimal design is then a function of what she wants to learn and how she intends to intervene if she uncovers excessive exposures. The choice of optimal scenarios depend on the principal’s priors about risk exposures, the cost of ex-post interventions, and the potential correlation of exposures across and within agents. We develop a tractable framework to study the optimal design of stress scenarios. A risk-averse principal (e.g., a manager, a regulator) seeks to learn about the exposures of a group of agents (e.g., traders, banks) to a set of risk factors. The principal asks the agents to report their outcomes (e.g., credit losses) under a variety of scenarios that she designs. She can then take remedial actions (e.g., mandate reductions in risk exposures). The principal’s program has two parts. For a given set of scenarios, we show how to apply a Kalman filter to solve the learning problem. The optimal design is then a function of what she wants to learn and how she intends to intervene if she uncovers excessive exposures. The choice of optimal scenarios depend on the principal’s priors about risk exposures, the cost of ex-post interventions, and the potential correlation of exposures across and within agents.
15:00 • EPF Lausanne, Zoom Seminar